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Abstract. This paper provides an evolutionary foundation for our capacity to
attribute preferences to others. This ability is intrinsic to game theory, and is a key
component of “Theory of Mind”, perhaps the capstone of social cognition. We argue
here that this component of theory of mind allows organisms to efficiently modify
their behavior in strategic environments with a persistent element of novelty. Such
environments are represented here by multistage games of perfect information with
randomly chosen outcomes. “Theory of Mind” then yields a sharp, unambiguous
advantage over less sophisticated, behavioral approaches to strategic interaction. In
related experiments, we show the subscale for social skills in standard tests for autism
is a highly significant determinant of the speed of learning in such games.
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1. Introduction
An individual with theory of mind (ToM ) has the ability to conceive of himself, and
of others, as having agency, and so to attribute to himself and others mental states
such as belief, desire, knowledge, and intent. It is generally accepted in psychology that
human beings beyond early infancy possess ToM. More specifically, it is conventional
in game theory to make the crucial assumption, without much apology, that agents
have ToM in the sense of imputing preferences to others.
The present paper considers ToM in greater depth by addressing the question: Why
and how might have such an ability evolved? In what types of environments would ToM
yield a distinct advantage over alternative, less sophisticated, approaches to strategic
interaction? In general terms, the answer we propose is that ToM is an evolutionary
adaptation for dealing with strategic environments that have a persistent element of
novelty.
The argument made here in favor of theory of mind is a substantial generalization
and reformulation of the argument in Robson (2001) concerning the advantage of
having an own utility function in a non-strategic setting. In that paper, an own utility
function permits an optimal response to novelty. Suppose an agent has experienced all
of the possible outcomes, but has not experienced and does not know the probabilities
with which these are combined. This latter element introduces the requisite novelty.
If the agent has the biologically appropriate utility function, she can learn the correct
gamble to take; conversely, if she acts correctly over a sufficiently rich set of gambles,
she must possess, although perhaps only implicitly, the appropriate utility function.
We shift focus here to a dynamic model in which players repeatedly interact with one
another but in which the set of games that they might face becomes larger and larger
with time. We presume individuals have an appropriate own utility function. The
focus is then on the advantage to an agent of conceiving of her opponents as rational
actors—as having preferences, in particular, and understanding that they act optimally
in the light of these. Having a template into which the preferences of an opponent can
be fitted enables a player to deal with a higher rate of innovation than can a behavioral
type of individual that adapts to each game as a distinct set of circumstances. In other
words, the edge to ToM derives from a capacity to extrapolate to novel circumstances
information that was learned about preferences in a specific case.
The distinction between the ToM and behavioral types might usefully be illustrated
with reference to the following observations of vervet monkeys (Cheney and Seyfarth
(1990), p. 213). If two groups are involved in a skirmish, sometimes a member of the
losing side is observed to make a warning cry used by vervets to signal the approach
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of a leopard. All the vervets will then urgently disperse, saving the day for the losing
combatant. The issue is: What is the genesis of this deceptive behavior? One possibility, corresponding to our theory of mind type, is that the deceptive vervet appreciates
what the effect of such a cry would be on the others, understands that is, that they
are averse to a leopard attack and exploits this aversion deliberately. The other polar
extreme corresponds to our behavioral adaptive learners. Such a type has no model
whatever of the other monkeys’ preferences and beliefs. His alarm cry behavior conditions simply on the circumstance that he is losing a fight. By accident perhaps, he
once made the leopard warning in such a circumstance and it had a favorable outcome.
Subsequent reapplication of this strategy continued to be met with success, reinforcing
the behavior.
Consider the argument in greater detail. We begin by fixing a game tree with
perfect information, with stages i  1 , ..., I. There are I equally large populations,
one for each of the associated “player roles.” In each period, a large number of random
matches are made, with each match having one player in each role i  1 , .., I. The
outcomes needed to complete the game are drawn randomly and uniformly in each
period from a finite outcome set. Each player has a preference ordering over the entire
infinite set of possible outcomes. Each player is fully aware of his own ordering but
does not directly know the preference ordering of his opponents.
Occasionally, a new outcome is added to the outcome set, where each new outcome
is drawn independently from a given distribution. The number of outcomes available
grows to infinity at a parametric rate. We use this device of a growing outcome set as
a simple way of deriving the comparative rates at which the various behavioral types
learn.
All players are given the full history of the games played—the outcomes that were
chosen, and the choices that were made by all player roles. The types of players here
differ with respect to the extent and the manner of utilization of this information.
We compare two main categories of types of players—naive and theory-of-mind
(ToM ) types. The ToM types are disposed to learn others’ preferences. They apply
the information provided by the history available in each period to build up a detailed
picture of the preferences of the other roles. The naive types are characterized by
reinforcement learning, and treat each new game as a unfamiliar set of circumstances.
All types are assumed to avail themselves of a dominant choice in the subgame they
start, whenever such a dominant choice is available. This assumption is in the spirit
of focussing on the learning the preferences of others rather than considering the implications of knowing one’s own preferences.
The crucial aspect of the ToM behavior is that, in the long run, once the history
of the game has revealed the preferences of all subsequent players, they map these

4

preferences to an action. There is a particular ToM type, the SPE-ToM type, who
maps these preferences to the SPE choice for the subgame. This SPE-ToM type is
shown to evolutionarily dominate the population, in the long run. In the short run,
the ToM types understand enough about the game that they can learn the preferences
of other player roles. For example, it is common knowledge among all ToM types that
all players use dominant actions, if available.
The crucial feature of naive types is simply that they play the same strategy in
response to any new game. Even if the naive types are ultra-fast learners, and use
the SPE strategy the second time a game is played, as is usually literally impossible,
they will still lose the evolutionary race here to the SPE-ToM type. More reasonable
assumptions on the rate of learning for the naive types would only strengthen our
results. This characterization of naive types is in line with “evolutionary game theory,”
which was inspired, in turn, by the psychological theory of reinforcement learning.
Another simplification is that we assume that the ToM types do not avail themselves
of the transitivity of opponents’ preferences. The ToM types build up a description
of others’ preferences only by learning all the pairwise choices. Again, relaxing this
assumption would only strengthen our results.
Theorem 1 is the basic result here—in an intermediate range of growth rates of the
outcome set, the ToM types will learn opponents’ preferences with a probability that
converges to one, while the naive types see a familiar game with a probability that
converges to zero. The greater adaptation of the ToM type simply reflects that there
are vastly more possible games that can be generated from a given number of outcomes
than there are outcome pairs.
In principle, there are various ways the ToM types might exploit this greater knowledge at the expense of the naive types. We have set up the model to favor a simple
and salient possibility, as expressed as the main result in Theorem 2—that the unique
SPE is attained, with the SPE-ToM type ultimately dominant, over all other ToM
types, as well as over all the naive types.
We also report here closely related experiments on Theory of Mind that buttress
the current approach. In these experiments, we fix the outcome set, rather than allow
this to grow over time. Also for simplicity, we consider only two-stage games where
each player role has two moves at each decision node. As is the crucial feature of the
theoretical model, all players in a given role had the same (induced) preferences, and
players knew only their own payoff at each outcome and not that of their opponent.
We randomly and anonymously paired subjects in each of 90 repetitions to observe the
ability of players 1 to learn (and exploit knowledge of) the preferences of players 2.
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Our design alleviates two potential confounds which arise in this setting. First,
such a game might have a dominant strategy for player 1; any such game provides
no opportunity for the experimenter to infer whether player 1 has learned player 2’s
preferences. Second, there are some such two stage games where a simple “highest
mean” rule of thumb adequately guides player 1—choose between your two actions
based on a 50-50 expectation of the resulting payoffs for you. Before player 1 has
observed any of player 2’s choices, this rule of thumb will be indeed be optimal, given
that players’ preferences are uncorrelated. This is because player 2 will randomize 5050 from player 1’s perspective. To get greater mileage from the experiments, we thus
divided each experimental session into three treatments designed to gradually eliminate
these confounds by varying the outcome set from which games were drawn. The four
outcomes in the first treatment were chosen in an unconstrained way so dominant
strategies did sometimes arise and the rule of thumb sometimes gave the right choice.
The outcomes in the second treatment were chosen so that dominant strategies could
not arise but the rule of thumb still sometimes worked. The outcomes in the third
treatment, which comprised 2/3 of the session, were chosen so that the rule of thumb
never gave the right answer (and thus there were also no dominant strategies). Thus,
the final 60 periods provide a particularly difficult setting in which the only way to
perform well in the role of player 1 is to learn the preferences of player 2.
At the end of each experimental session, we asked the students to complete two short
multiple-choice surveys measuring autism. One was the Autism-Spectrum Quotient
(AQ) survey; the other was the Broad Autism Phenotype Questionnaire (BAP). Of
particular relevance here is the subscale on each of these two tests that rates social
skills (Social Skills - in the BAP and Aloofness in the AQ).
The results of the experiments were striking. First, we observed statistically and
quantitatively significant learning of player 2 preferences by players 1. This learning
is evident during the third treatment when the rule of thumb cannot work. Second, a
particularly salient finding was that player 1’s with lower scores on the social subscales
(i.e. players who exhibit greater social skills) were highly likely (with p=0.01) to learn
player 2’s choices faster.
These experiments corroborate the present approach on two grounds. In the first
place, the theoretical model apparently captures important features of real world
decision-making. To ascribe preferences to an opponent and to endeavor to learn
these, to one’s own advantage, is a real world ability, and one that is present to a varying extent in individuals. Secondly, correlations between behavior in the experiment
and survey measures of autism spectrum suggest that preference learning ability in
strategic settings is closely tied to a central aspect of theory of mind, as this term is
used in psychology.
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2. The Theoretical Model
2.1. The Environment.
We begin by defining the underlying games. The extensive game form is a fixed
tree with perfect information and a finite number of stages, I ¥ 2 and actions, A, at
each decision node.1 There is one “player role” for each such stage, i  1 , ..., I, in the
game. Each player role is represented by an equally large population of agents. These
agents may have different “strategic types”, in a way that is described below, but all
such types have identical payoff functions. To describe the basic elements of the game,
all that matters, then, is how each player role maps outcomes to expected offspring.
Independently in each period, all players are randomly and uniformly matched with
exactly one player for each role in each of the resulting large number of games.2 There
is a fixed overall set of outcomes, each with consequences for the reproductive success
of the I types of agents. Player role i  1 , . . . , I is then characterized by a function
mapping outcomes to expected numbers of offspring. A fundamental novelty is that,
although each player role knows its own payoff at each outcome, it does not know the
payoff for the other player roles.
For notational simplicity, however, we finesse consideration of explicit outcomes and
payoff functions from outcomes to expected offspring. Given a fixed tree structure
with T terminal nodes, we instead simply identify each outcome with a payoff vector
and each game with a particular set of such payoff vectors assigned to the terminal
nodes.
A1: The set of all games is represented by Q  rm, M sT I , for M ¡ m ¡ 0 . That is,
each outcome is a payoff vector in Z  rm, M sI , with one component for each player
role, and there are T such outcomes comprising each game.
Let t  1 , 2 , . . . , denote successive time periods. At date t, there is available a set
of outcomes Zt  Z, determined in the following way. There is an initial finite set
of outcomes Z1  Z where each of these outcomes is drawn independently from Z
according to a cumulative distribution function F as follows.3
A2: The cdf over outcomes F has a continuous probability density f that is strictly
positive on Z.
1 The

restriction that each node induce the same number of actions, A, can readily be relaxed

by allowing equivalent moves, in which case A can be interpreted as the maximum number of
actions available at any node in the entire tree. Indeed, it is possible to allow the game tree
to be randomly chosen. This would not fundamentally change the nature of our results but
would considerably add to the notation required.
2 Uniform
3 The

matching is not crucial to our results but chosen in the interest of simplicity.

assumption that the initial set is drawn from F can readily be relaxed.
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There is then a subsequence of time periods ttk u8
. At date tk , k  1 , 2 , . . . , a k-th
k 1
outcome is added to the existing ones by drawing it independently from Z according
to F .4 In between arrival dates the set of outcomes is fixed, and once an outcome
is introduced it is available thereafter. The available set of outcomes in period t is
then Z1 Y tz1 , . . . , zk u , whenever tk ¤ t tk 1 , where zk P Z denotes the introduced
outcome at arrival date tk .
We parameterize the rate at which the environment becomes increasingly complex in
a fashion that yields a straightforward connection between this rate and the advantages
to theory of mind.
A3: Fix α ¥ 0 . The arrival date sequence ttk u satisfies, for each k
tp|Z1 |
k qα u.5

 1,2,..., t 
k

Consider now a convenient formal description of the set of games available at each
date.
Definition 1: At date t, the empirical cdf based on sampling, with equal probabilities,
from the outcomes that are actually available at date t, is denoted by the random
function Ft pz q where z P rm, M sI . Similarly, the empirical cdf of games at date t is
denoted by Gt pq q, where q P Q  rm, M sIT .6 The set of games available at date t is
denoted by Qt .
We suppose that, at each date t, an extensive form game denoted qt is drawn at
random from Qt —uniformly and independently from the sequence of previously realized games. The players in each match then independently play qt . Players of each
4 This

abbreviated way of modeling outcomes introduces the apparent complication that the

same payoff for role i might be associated with multiple possible payoffs for the remaining
players. Knowing your own payoff does not then imply knowing the outcome. This issue could
be addressed by supposing that there is a unique label attached to each payoff vector, and
that each player role observes this label, as well as his payoff. However, given that the cdf F
is continuous, the probability of any role’s payoff arising more than once is zero. Each player
i can then safely assume that a given payoff is associated to a unique outcome and a unique
vector of other roles’ payoffs.
We do not consider how ToM types might update beliefs about opponents’ payoffs in the light
of their own observed payoff. All that we rely on is that, if history establishes another player
role’s preference between two outcomes for sure, then the ToM types learn. All that we rely
on concerning the naive types is that they can only learn from repeated exposure to a given
game.
5 Here



t u

denotes the floor function. It seems more plausible, perhaps, that these arrival

dates would be random. This makes the analysis mathematically more complex, but does not
seem to fundamentally change the results. The present assumption is then in the interests of
simplicity.
6 Note that F and G are random variables measurable with respect to the information
t
t
available at date t, in particular the set of available outcomes Zt .
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strategic type within a given player role are constrained to use the same strategy. For
simplicity, indeed, the ToM types are ultimately constrained to use pure strategies.7
The cdf’s Ft and Gt are well-behaved in the limit. This result is elegant and so
warrants inclusion here. First note that the distribution of games implied by the cdf
on outcomes, F is given by G, say, which is the cdf on the payoff space rm, M sIT
generated by T independent choices of outcomes distributed according to F . Clearly,
G also has a continuous pdf g that is strictly positive on rm, M sIT . These cdf’s are
then the limits of the cdf’s Ft and Gt —
Lemma 1: It follows that Ft pz q Ñ F pz q and Gt pq q Ñ Gpq q with probability one, and
uniformly in z P rm, M sI , or in q P rm, M sIT , respectively.
Proof. This follows directly from the Glivenko-Cantelli Theorem. (See Billingsley, p.
275, and Eike, Pollard and Stute, p. 825, for its extension to many dimensions).

The evolutionary bottom line is then as follows—each I-tuple playing each game
generate children according to the outcome obtained. The current generation then
dies and their offspring become the next generation of players. The offspring of each
type of i player become i players of the same type in the following period. We normalize
the number of children born to each type of i player by dividing this number by the
total number of offspring produced by all players in role i.
We turn now to consideration of the “strategic types” within each player role.
2.2. Strategic Types.
We allow a finite number of different “strategic types” within each role. When
making a choice at date t every player is informed of a publicly observed history
Ht  tZt , pq1 , π1 q, . . . , pqt1 , πt1 qu, and the game qt drawn in the current period.
The history records the outcomes available at date t, the randomly drawn games up
to the previous period, and the empirical distributions of choices made by previous
generations.8 In particular, for each player role i decision-node h that is reached by a
positive fraction of players in period τ , πτ phq P ∆pAq records the aggregate behavior
of date τ i player roles at h. Let H t be the set of date t histories, and H  Yt¥1 H t .
7 That

is, the ToM types use pure strategies when they know the preferences of all the

subsequent players. This is a harmless simplification, since the ToM type that will prevail
in the long run is a pure strategy in these circumstances. Naive types are assumed to mix
uniformly when the game is new.
8 Although each player observes the previous games in the sense of seeing the outcomes assigned
to each terminal node, as revealed by the payoff she is assigned at that node, it should be
emphasized that she does not observe other roles’ payoffs directly.
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Recall that in each period t, every extensive form in Qt shares the same underlying
game tree. Then, let Σi denote the set of strategies available to the player role i’s of
any given date.
We partition each player role population into groups differing with respect to strategic types. Specifically, for each i  1 , . . . , I, there is a finite set of functions Ci 
tc : H  Q ÝÑ Σiu . These are the i player strategic types. Each i player is associated with a c P Ci , which determines his choice of strategy. Moreover, we assume
these types are inheritable. Specifically, an individual in period t with strategic type
c chooses the strategy cpHt , qt q in game qt , his children choose cpHt 1 , qt 1 q in qt 1 ,
his grandchildren choose cpHt 2 , qt 2 q, and so on. Variation in strategic types allows
for different levels of sophistication within each player role. Some of these types are
players who see others as having agency, other types do not see this.
As part of the specification of the map c, we assume that all individuals choose
a strictly dominant action in the subgame they initiate, whenever such an action is
available. For example, the player at the last stage of the game always chooses the
outcome that she strictly prefers. This general assumption is in the spirit of focussing
upon the implications of other players payoffs rather than the implications of one’s
own payoffs. This assumption incorporates an element of sequential rationality, since
such a dominant strategy is conditional upon having reached the node in question,
that is, conditional on the previous history of the game.9
To be more precise, the assumption is—
A4: Consider any i player role, and an i player subgame q. The action a at q is dominant for i if for every action a1  a, for every outcome z available in the continuation
game after i’s choice of a in q, and every outcome z 1 available in the continuation game
after i’s choice of a1 in q, zi ¡ zi1 . For each i  1 , . . . , I, every strategic type in Ci
always chooses any such dominant action. When indifferent between several courses
of action a player mixes evenly between these actions.
We assume there are two main categories of types of players—
Naive players. We adopt a relaxed concept of naivete, which serves to make the
ultimate results stronger. The only additional requirement on the map c is that a naive
player must choose a fixed arbitrary strategy whenever the game is novel. For specificity, suppose naive players in this situation mix uniformly over all available actions.
9 Given

suitable noise, this element of sequential rationality is assured, and this property can

be made a result rather than an assumption. That is, a strategy that did not use a dominant
choice would be driven to extinction under any plausible evolutionary dynamic. We omit this
proof for conciseness.
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(Naive players also choose any strictly dominant action in the remaining subgame,
as in A4.) Although it is highly implausible, we could indeed allow naive players to
play the SPE strategy that is appropriate for the underlying unknown preferences of
subsequent players, in the second repetition of each game. This is highly implausible
since it is not generally possible to deduce the payoffs that rapidly and neither could
convergence to an SPE once preferences are known but other agents make non-SPE
choices be that rapid. Nevertheless, even if the naive players are ultra-fast learners,
the sophisticated ToM players will out-compete them, given only the naive players’
inability to adapt in any way to a new game. To the extent that naive players fail to
be such ultra-fast learners, our results would simply be strengthened.
Consider now a category of Theory of Mind strategic types. Intuitively, these types
conceive of opponents as making choices according to well defined preferences and
beliefs. All of the ToM types need not agree at the outset about what these preference
orderings are, but they all know there are some preferences influencing j players’
choices in every period, and they learn what these preference are.
Theory of Mind Players.
What this means precisely is as follows. The important long run aspect of the
behavior of these ToM types is that, if the history of the game has revealed the
preferences of all subsequent players, perhaps in the way that is described in detail
below, these ToM types map these preferences into an action. In particular, in every
role, there is a positive fraction of a special type of ToM called SPE -ToM which plays
a subgame perfect equilibrium action given these known preferences of subsequent
players. Recall that, as part of the map c, ToM players choose any strictly dominant
action in the remaining subgame, as in A4. In the short run, in order to learn others’
preferences, it is important that all the ToM players know that all other players also
use dominant actions if available, as in A4; further, this is common knowledge among
the ToM players. The presence of some ToM players in every role is also common
knowledge among all the ToM types.
The assumptions here on the ToM types are relatively weak. For example, the
assumption that ToM types have common knowledge that all types choose a dominant
action is in the spirit of focussing here on the implications of the preferences of others,
while presuming full use of one’s own preferences. Further, it is merely for expositional
clarity that we describe the short run learning behavior of the ToM types in terms of
common knowledge. The entire description can be recast in pure “revealed preference”
terms. How this can be done is discussed after the statement of Theorem 1.
We can now describe the strategic environment as follows
E

 pI, A, Z, F, α, tM u P q ,
i1

i I
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where the new variable is Mi1 giving the initial distribution of strategic types in player
role i. Recall that I and A describe the fixed game tree, F is the distribution on
Z  rm, M sI over introduced outcomes, and α governs the rate of introduction of
novel outcomes.
2.3. The Theoretical Results.
There are two main theoretical results. The first shows that the ToM types learn
the preferences of other roles, so these become common knowledge among all ToM
types in all roles. The second shows how the ToM s might exploit this knowledge by
playing the SPE of the game.
Definition 2: The history Ht reveals players in role i strictly prefer z to z 1 if for all
E satisfying A4 whenever Ht occurs it becomes common knowledge among ToMs that
zi ¡ zi1 .
The notion is well defined. In particular—
Lemma 2: Suppose A4 holds and that there are ToMs in every role i ¡ 1 . Then for
every finite subset X  Z there exists a finite history H P H such that for each j P I,
and z, z 1 P X, if zj ¡ zj1 , then H reveals players in role j strictly prefer z to z 1 .
Now, for each i  1 , . . . , I, let Lit denote the fraction of pairs pz, z 1 q P Zt  Zt where
Ht reveals i’s favored outcome between tz, z 1 u.10 To evaluate the performance of the
naive players, let γt be the fraction of games (of those in Qt ) that have been played
previously at date t. Let T ¥ 4 be the number of terminal nodes in the fixed game
tree.11 It follows that T is the cut-off point for the naive types. We then have the
following key result that sets the stage for establishing the evolutionary dominance of
the SPE -ToM ’s over all other players—
Theorem 1: Suppose E satisfies assumptions A1-A4. If α 2 , then Lit surely converges to zero, i  1 , . . . , I. If α T , then γt surely converges to zero. On the other
hand, if α ¡ T , then γt converges in probability to one. If α ¡ 2 , and additionally A4
holds, then Lit converges in probability to one for each i  1 , . . . , I.
This is proved in the Appendix. This result says that if α ¡ 2 , and, in particular, if
all types adopt strictly dominant acts, whenever these are available, where the ToM s
have common knowledge that this is true, then all preferences are revealed in the limit
10 Recall

that for simplicity, we assume that players mix whenever indifferent and that this

too is common knowledge among the ToM types. This means that such indifference can be
ruled out. However, such indifference has probability 0.
11 If

the I player roles have A actions each, then T

 AI .
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to the ToM s. This is the crucial result here, since if, at the same time, α
T , all
the naive players see new games essentially always and mix uniformly, in a way that
is generally inappropriate.12
An intuitive description of how the ToM types learn preferences is useful. Consider
a ToM type in a particular player role j ¡ 1 . The argument that this type can obtain
the preferences of subsequent player roles proceeds by backwards induction on these
subsequent roles. Players in the last role choose a preferred action and this is revealed
in the choices that j ¡ 1 sees. A player in role j also knows that all ToM types in
all roles now know this as well. Eventually a complete picture of player 1 ’s preference
can be built up as common knowledge among all the ToM types. As the induction
hypothesis, suppose the preferences of i  2 , . . . , 1 for i ¤ j have been established
as common knowledge among the ToM types. We need to show that j can similarly
obtain the preferences of i  1 . Suppose then that a game is drawn in which player
role i  1 in fact has a dominant action, a, say, after which i  2 has a dominant
action, after which i  3 has a dominant action, after which... Furthermore, there is
another action, a1 , say, that i  1 could take, after which again i  2 has a dominant
action, after which... Player j knows the situation faced by i  2 , ..., 1 . Since, in fact,
players in role i  1 have a dominant action, all types take this. Player j can see that
all i  1 ’s have made the same choice, so that the ToM s there who made this choice
must then prefer the outcome induced by a to the outcome induced by a1 . Eventually,
ToM j ¥ i can build up a complete picture of the preferences of the role i  1 .13
This description of learning shows how the common knowledge assumptions concerning the ToM types can be stripped to their bare revealed preference essentials.
It is unimportant, that is, what the ToM types think, in any literal sense. All that
matters is that it is as if the ToM s in roles i, ..., I add to their knowledge of role i  1 ’s
preferences in the circumstances considered above. Once a ToM type in role i, for
example, has experienced all of role i  1 binary choices being put to the test like this,
given that this is already true for roles i  2 , ..., 1 , this role i ToM type can map the
preferences for subsequent players to an action.
All that remains then, to complete the argument, is to show that the ToM types
will do better than the naive types by exploiting their knowledge of all other players’
12 Naive

players do not always make inappropriate choices, because they adopt dominant

strategies, whenever these are available. They are often not available, of course.
13 The above learning process relies on relatively weak assumptions concerning the sophistication of the ToM s, as is desirable in this evolutionary context. As a result, it also relies on
improbable events and so seems bound to be undesirably slow. However, this process suffices
to establish that complete learning by the ToM s occurs whenever α
mechanically impossible to learn others’ preferences when α
cannot significantly improve the result.

¡ 2.

Further, since it is

2 , a more sophisticated process
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preferences, while the naive types are overwhelmed by novel games. This will be true
in a variety of circumstances; for simplicity, we focus on assumptions that yield the
generically unique SPE.
We now have the main result—
Theorem 2: Consider an environment, E , satisfying assumptions A1-A4. Suppose
that there are a finite number of types—naive and ToM, one of which is the SPE-ToM.
Suppose further that every alternative to the SPE-ToM, that is a also a ToM type,
differs from the SPE-ToM at every reached decision node in a set of games that arises
with positive probability under the distribution F . If α P p2 , T q, then the proportion
of SPE-ToM in role i, Rit , say, tends to 1 in probability, i  2 , ..., I.
Note that we focus here on the case that α P p2 , T q.14
3. Experiments on Theory of Mind
3.1. Experimental Design.
We report here the results of experiments that are simplified versions of the theoretical model. These test the ability of individuals to learn the preferences of others
through repeated interaction and to use that information strategically to their advantage. The game tree is a two-stage extensive form where each player has two choices
at each decision node.
There are then two player roles, 1 and 2. Player roles differ in their position in the
game tree and their (induced) preferences, but all players of a given role have identical
preferences. In each period, each role 1 participant is randomly and anonymously
matched with a single role 2 participant to play a two-stage extensive form game, as
depicted in figure C1, in appendix C. We employ this matching scheme to at least
diminish the likelihood of supergame effects. In each game, role 1 players always
move first, choosing one of two intermediate nodes (displayed in the figure as blue
circles), and then based on that decision, the role 2 player chooses a terminal node
that determines payoffs for each participant (displayed in the figure as a pair of boxes).
14 If

α

2 , the ToM players are also overwhelmed with novelty.

The ToM s may still

outperform the naive players, but this depends on the detailed behavior of the ToM s when
facing games in which the payoffs of other players are unknown. In the case that α

¡ T , the

relative performance of the two types depends on the detailed behavior of the naive players.
If the naive players are ultra-fast learners, and play an SPE strategy the second time they
encounter a given game, they might keep up with the ToM s. More realistically, they would
not learn so quickly, and so would lag the ToM s.

14

When making their decisions, participants only observe their own payoff at each
outcome and are originally uninformed of the payoff for the other participant. Instead,
they know only that payoff pairs are consistent over time. That is, whenever the payoff
for role 1 is X, the payoff to role 2 will always be the same number Y. In figure C1,
which is shown from the perspective of a role 1 participant, his own payoff at each
terminal node is shown in the orange box, while his counterpart’s payoff is displayed
as a “?”. Similarly, when role 2 players make their decisions, they only observe their
own payoffs and see a “?” for their counterpart (see figure C2).
In each period, the payoffs at each terminal node are drawn without replacement
randomly from a finite set of V payoff pairs. Each pair of payoffs is unique, guaranteeing a strict preference ordering over outcomes. This set is fixed in the experiments
in contrast to its growth in the theoretical model. We do not then attempt to study
the theoretical long run in the experiments, but content ourselves with observing the
rate of learning of opponents’ preferences. Allowing for the strategic equivalence of
games in which the two payoff pairs at a given terminal node are presented in reverse


order, there are V2 V 22 {2 strategically distinct games that can be generated from
V payoff pairs, each of which has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium.
Thus, as in the theoretical model, despite their initial ignorance of their counterpart’s
preferences, role 1 players can learn about these preferences over time, by observing
how role 2 players respond to various choices presented to them in the repetitions of
the game. If role 1 players correctly learn role 2 players’ preferences, they can increase
their own payoff by choosing the SPE action. On the face of it, role 1 players have
then developed a theory of a role 2 player’s mind.
This suggests investigating whether role 1 players choose in a manner that is increasingly consistent with the SPE. Initial pilot sessions revealed two issues with this
strategy: 1) many of the randomly generated games include dominant strategies for
player 1, which are not informative for inferring capacity to learn the preferences of
others, as indeed reflected in the theoretical model, and 2) more subtly, there is a
simple “highest mean” rule of thumb that also often generates SPE play. Consider a
player 1 who is initially uncertain about player 2’s preferences. From the point of view
of player 1, given independence of player 2’s preferences, player 2 is equally likely to
choose each terminal node, given player 1’s choice. The expected payoff maximizing
strategy is to choose the intermediate node at which the average of potential terminal
payoffs is highest. Indeed, our pilot sessions suggested that many participants followed
this strategy, which was relatively successful.
For these reasons, we used a 3x1 within-subjects experimental design that, over the
course of an experimental session, pares down the game set to exclude the games in
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which choice is too simple to be informative. Specifically, each session included games
drawn from 7 payoff pairs (so there are 105 possible games). In seven of our sessions,
payoff possibilities for each participant consisted of integers between 1 and 7, and in
our final two sessions the set was {1,2,3,4,8,9,10}.15 The one exception was our first
session which used only 6 payoff pairs, where payoffs were integers between 1 and 6.16
Each session lasted for 90 periods in which, in the first 15 periods, the game set
included 15 randomly chosen games from the set Q. Starting in the 16th period, we
eliminate all games in which player 1 has a dominant strategy, and the next 15 periods
consist of games randomly drawn from this subset of Q. Finally, starting in the 31st
period, we also eliminate all games in which the optimal strategy under the “highest
mean” rule of thumb corresponds to the SPE of the game, and our final 60 periods
consist of randomly drawn games from this smaller subset. Thus, our final 60 periods
make it harder for player 1 to achieve high payoffs, since the only effective strategy is
to learn the preferences of the role 2 players.
One potential issue with our design is that learning would be disrupted by the
presence of any role 2 player who fails to choose his dominant action. For this reason,
we considered automating the role 2 player. However, on reflection, this design choice
seems untenable. In the instructions, we would need to explain that algorithmic players
2 maximize their payoffs in each stage, which would eliminate all but the mechanics of
the inference problem faced by player 1—in essence the instructions would be providing
the theory of mind.
A second potential concern is that foregone payoffs (due to role 1 player’s choice)
may lead to non-rational behavior by some player 2s. Such behavior involves role 2
players solving a difficult inference problem. A spiteful (or altruistic) player 2, who
wanted to punish (or reward) player 1 on the basis of player 2’s foregone payoffs, first
must infer that player 1 has learned player 2’s preferences and then infer player 1’s own
preferences on the basis of this assumption. Player 2 could then, given his options,
choose the higher or lower of the two payoffs for player 1 as either punishment or
reward. However, players 2 chose their dominant action roughly 90% of the time, which
suggests that these sources of error were not a prominent feature of our experiment.
We related our results directly to theory of mind, as this is measured by two short
survey instruments. At the conclusion of the experiment, participants completed the
15 This

variation was employed in our final two sessions and was intended to reduce noise by

more strongly disincentivizing player 2 from choosing a dominated option, but observed player
2 choices in these sessions are comparable to those in other sessions, so we pool the data for
analysis below.
16 We include this session in our data analysis, but our results are qualitatively unchanged if
we exclude it.
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Autism-Spectrum Quotient (AQ) survey designed by Baron-Cohen [1], since autism
spectrum reflects varying degrees of inability to “read” others’ minds. This short survey
has been shown to correlate with clinical diagnoses of autism spectrum disorders, but
it is not used for clinical purposes. Participants also completed the Broad Autism
Phenotype Questionnaire (BAP) due to Hurley [5], which provides a similar measure
of autism spectrum behavior. With this additional data we will be able to evaluate
how each participant’s ability to perform as player 1 in our experiments correlates
with two other well-known ToM metrics. Copies of the questionnaires are available in
Appendices D and E.
We report data from 11 experimental sessions with a total of 86 participants (43
in each role). Each experimental session consisted of 6-10 participants, recruited from
the student body of Simon Fraser University. Participants entered the lab and were
seated at visually isolated computer terminals where they privately read self-paced
instructions. A monitor was available to privately answer any questions about the
instructions. After reading the instructions, if there were no additional questions, the
experiment began. Instructions are available in Appendix B.
Each experimental session took between 90 and 120 minutes. At the conclusion
of each session, participants were paid privately in cash equal to their payoffs from
two (2) randomly chosen periods. We use this protocol to increase the salience of
each individual decision, thereby inducing participants to treat each game as payoffrelevant. For each chosen period, the payoff from that period was multiplied by 2
or 3 (depending on the session) and converted to CAD. Average salient experimental
earnings were $27.22, with a maximum of $45 and a minimum of $13. In addition
to their earnings from the two randomly chosen periods, participants also received $7
for arriving to the experiment on time. Upon receiving payment, participants were
dismissed.
3.2. Experimental Results.
Since the decision problem is trivial for player 2, our analysis focuses entirely on
decisions by player 1. We focus on the probability with which player 1 chose an action
consistent with the SPE of the game. For a given game tree, and with repeated play
with fixed matching and private information about individual payoffs, it is known that
pairs frequently converge to non-cooperative equilibrium outcomes over time [4, 6]. In
such a setting, an individual merely need learn her counterpart’s preferences over two
pairwise comparisons. Our setting is more strategically complex, and hence we are able
to observe heterogeneity in ToM capabilities and exploit this in our data analysis.
First, we describe overall learning trends and we show that learning is correlated
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with both Autism Quotient and Broad Autism Phenotype scores. Finally, we analyze
individual rates of learning and show that learning speed is highly correlated with AQ
and BAP subscales associated with social skills.
3.2.1. Overall Averages.

0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4

Probability P1 Chooses SPNE

0.8

0.9

Figure 1 displays a time series of the probability that player 1 chose an action consistent with knowledge of player 2’s preferences (i.e. consistent with SPE) over the 90
periods of the experiment. After 15 periods, the game set no longer included instances
where player 1 had a dominant strategy. After 30 periods, the game set no longer included instances where player 1 would choose correctly by following the “highest mean”
rule of thumb. At period 31, when subjects enter the NoDominant/NoHeuristic treatment, there is a significant downtick in player 1’s performance, but afterwards there is
a notable upward trend in the probability of player 1 choosing optimally.17
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Figure 1:

Time Series of Learning Opponent’s Preferences.

Table 1 reports linear probability panel regressions where the dependent variable
takes a value of 1 if player 1 chose an action consistent with the SPE of the game
and 0 otherwise. We include treatment dummies for periods 1-15 and periods 1630 to control for the game set. We also include an individual’s AQ score in column
17 Table

F1 in Appendix F also reports summary statistics for each experimental session.
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(2) and BAP score in column (3) to investigate the effect of autism spectrum scores
on learning rates. Higher scores on both instruments indicate increasing presence of
autism spectrum behaviors. We include random effects for each subject to control for
repeated measures, and we cluster standard errors at the session level.

(1)

(2)

(3)

P1 Chose SPNE

P1 Chose SPNE

P1 Chose SPNE

-0.009

Autism Quotient

(0.004)
Broader Autism Phenotype

(0.041)

Period

0.003

No Dominant Options

0.132

All Treatments

0.276

Constant

0.466

0.573

0.669

(0.043)

(0.071)

(0.138)

Observations

3960

3960

3960

Wald Chi-Sq.

41.57

50.27

68.99

(0.001)
(0.027)
(0.043)

0.003

-0.069

(0.001)

0.132
(0.027)

0.276
(0.043)

0.003
(0.001)

0.132
(0.027)

0.276
(0.043)

Clustered standard errors in parentheses.

 p

0.01,

Table 1:

 p

0.05,

p

0.1.

Regression Analysis of Learning.

The positive and significant estimated coefficient on Period indicates that participants are increasingly likely to choose optimally over time. Thus, even in this complex
setting, individuals are able to learn the preferences of others. Positive and significant
coefficients on the treatment dummy variables support our decision to screen out the
games with dominant and highest mean rule of thumb strategies. Moreover, negative
and significant estimated coefficients on the AQ and BAP scores provide the first evidence that our games reflect ToM as implicated in autism. A one standard deviation
increase in AQ score is associated with a 4.1 percentage point reduction in the probability of choosing optimally, on average. Similarly, a one standard deviation increase
in BAP score is associate with a 3.2 percentage point reduction. We summarize these
findings below:
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Finding 1: On average, there is a significant increase in understanding of others’
preferences over time, despite individual variation.
Finding 2: This increase in learning is correlated with the AQ and BAP questionnaires.

3.2.2. Individual Heterogeneity in Learning Rates.
Our finding that the AQ and BAP scores are correlated with average performance
is suggestive, but the most important aspect of ToM in our setting is learning the
preferences of others. The faster player 1 learns the preferences of role 2 players, the
higher his payoff. Hence, we now turn our attention to heterogeneity in individual
learning rates. In particular, we explore the relationship between individuals’ learning
rates in our experiment and their AQ and BAP scores.
To estimate individual learning rates for each player 1 we estimate a linear regression
where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 when the player chose a node consistent
with SPE and 0 otherwise and the independent variable is a period trend and a constant
term. We exclude all games with dominant strategies and all games in which the
“highest mean” rule of thumb yields the SPE choice. The coefficient on the period
trend, β, provides an estimate of each individual’s rate of learning. We them compute
simple correlation coefficients of individual βs and measures of ToM from the AQ
and BAP questionnaires. Recall that on both instruments, a higher score indicates
increased presence of more autism spectrum behaviors. Thus, negative correlations
will indicate that our rate of learning measure provides similar information to the AQ
and BAP surveys, while the absence of correlation or positive correlations will indicate
that ToM in strategic environments differs from ToM in other social contexts.
Table 2 reports these simple correlations between estimated β’s and various measures of autism spectrum intensity, and we include 90% confidence intervals for the
correlation coefficients. To indicate what portion of the variance in learning rates is
attributable to differences in autism spectrum scores, we also report R2 estimates from
separate OLS regressions where the dependent variable is an individual’s estimated β
and the independent variable is an individual’s score on a particular scale or sub-scale
of the AQ and BAP questionnaires.
From the table, we can see that learning rates are correlated with average AQ and
BAP scores, and this provides additional evidence that our games measure ToM .
However, most striking is the strong correlation between learning rates and the two
subscales that emphasize social skills: AQ Social and BAP Aloof. In particular, these
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Correlation Coef.
BAP
BAP Rigid

10%

90%

R-Squared

-0.25*

-1

-0.05

0.06

0.05

-1

0.25

0.00

BAP Aloof

-0.43***

-1

-0.25

0.18

BAP Prag

-0.14

-1

0.06

0.02

AQ

-0.21*

-1

-0.01

0.04

AQ Social

-0.47***

-1

-0.30

0.22

AQ Switch

-0.09

-1

0.11

0.01

AQ Detail

0.19

-1

0.38

0.04

AQ Commun

-0.15

-1

0.05

0.02

AQ Imagin

-0.21*

-1

-0.01

0.05

N
*** p

Table 2:

43
0.01, ** p

0.05, * p

0.1, one-sided tests.

Correlations between Autism Spectrum Measures and

Learning Rates.

BAP and AQ are overall scores from each instru-

ment. Other variables are individual scores on subscales of each instrument.

 Aloofness, BAP Prag  Pragmatic
 Social Skills, AQ Switch  Attention Switching, AQ Detail  Attention to Detail, AQ Commun  Communication Skills,
and AQ Imagin  Imagination.

BAP Rigid



Rigidity, BAP Aloof

Language Deficit, AQ Social

scales are concerned with the extent to which individuals understand and enjoy social
interaction. One particularly telling item on the AQ Social subscale asks individuals
how strongly they agree with the statement:
“I find it difficult to work out people’s intentions.”
This is precisely the idea of ToM in a strategic setting.
Learning is also correlated with the AQ Imagin subscale which measures “imagination” by asking respondents to what degree they enjoy/understand fiction and fictional
characters. One question asks about the ability to impute motives to fictional characters, which suggests some overlap with the AQ Social subscale. Most of the other
subscales exhibit negative but insignificant correlation coefficients. Interestingly, the
two subscales that exhibit non-negative coefficients (BAP Rigid and AQ Detail) emphasize precision in individual habits and attention to detail. In a strategic setting
such as ours, these traits might be expected to partly counteract the negative effects
of other typical ToM deficits, perhaps accounting for the lack of correlation.
Importantly, our survey data reveal measured ToM in the normal range. Thus,
differences in the strategic aspects of ToM vary significantly across individuals in the
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normal range of social intelligence. Figure 2 displays histograms of AQ and BAP scores
over the range of feasible scores.
Finding 3: Individual learning is highly correlated with the social skills subscales of
the AQ and BAP questionnaires.
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(b) Broad Autism Phenotype

Histograms of AQ and BAP Scores. Each panel includes

the entire range of feasible scores.

4. Conclusions
This paper presents a theoretical model of the evolution of theory of mind. The
model demonstrates the advantages to predicting opponents’ behavior in simple games
of perfect information. A departure from standard game theory is to allow the outcomes used in the game to be randomly selected from a growing outcome set. We show
how sophisticated individuals who recognize agency in others can build up a picture
of others’ preferences while naive players who react only to the complete game remain
in the dark. We impose plausible conditions under which sophisticated individuals
who choose the SPE action will dominate all other types of individual, sophisticated
or naive, in the long run.
We then perform experiments measuring the ability of individuals to learn the preferences of others in a strategic setting. The experiments implement a simplified version
of the theoretical model, using a two-stage game where each decision node involves two
choices. We find 1) evidence of significant learning over time, and 2) strong correlations
between behavior in these experiments and responses to two well-known survey instruments measuring ToM from psychology, thus justifying the use of the term “theory of
mind” in the present context. We show, in particular, that there is a highly significant
correlation between the social skill subscales on standard short tests for autism and
the rate at which player 1’s learn player 2’s preferences.
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Appendices
A. Proofs of the Theorems
A.1. Proof of Theorem 1.
A1- A4 will be assumed throughout without further mention.
We first establish (in Lemma 3 below) the negative claims of Theorem 1, that is, we
consider first arrival rates of novelty for which either Lit or γt converge to zero. After
this, the positive claim of Theorem 1 will be proved.
Lemma 3: Each of the following is true.
i) Suppose α P r0 , 2 q. Then Lit

ÝÑ 0

surely for each role i  1 , . . . , I.

ii) Recall there are T terminal nodes. If α P r0 , T q, then γt

ÝÑ 0

surely.

Proof. Consider any environment in which the underlying game tree has T end-nodes.
Clearly Lit ¤ t  T {|Zt |2 everywhere, since the maximal number of binary preference
orderings that can be revealed for any player at any date is bounded above by T . Similarly, since only one game is played in a period, γt ¤ t{|Zt |T surely. Since |Zt |  |Z1 | k
whenever tp|Z1 | k qα u ¤ t tp|Z1 | k 1 qα u, it follows that t p|Zt | 1 qα . Hence,
Lit

T

 r|Zt|

1 sα {|Zt |2 and γt

r|Zt|

1 sα {|Zt |T .

(1)

Surely |Zt | ÝÑ 8. The lemma follows immediately since obviously whenever α
for instance, (1) implies Lit ÝÑ 0 surely.

2,


In to prove the positive claims of Theorem 1 (that Lit converges to one when α ¡ 2 )
we proceed by induction using the following three results. First a required notation—
Definition 3: Let the random variable Kit denote the number of pairs pz, z 1 q such
that i’s preferred outcome in tzi , zi1 u has been revealed.
Lemma 4: Consider the 1 player role. Suppose α ¡ 2 . Then, for each ξ
is a sequence of random variables tθ1 t pξ qu such that
E pK1 t

1

| Htq  K ¥ rξ  p1  L  θ pξqqs
1t

1t

AI

P p0 , 1 s there

i

1t

for all t ¥ 1 , where each tθ1 t pξ qu is non-increasing between arrival dates, and converges
in probability to a function θ1 pξ q, which converges to zero as ξ approaches zero.
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Lemma 5: Consider a fitness type i P I. Suppose α ¡ 2 . Suppose further that for
each ξ P p0 , 1 s there is a sequence of random variables tθit pξ qu such that
I i
E pKit 1 | Ht q  Kit ¥ rξ  p1  Lit  θit pξ qqsA

for all t ¥ 1 , where each tθit pξ qu is non-increasing between arrival dates, and converges
in probability to a function θi pξ q, which converges to zero as ξ approaches zero. Then
tLitu converges to one in probability.
Lemmas 4 and 5 together imply that, if α ¡ 2 , then, for player role 1, L1 t converges
to one in probability. Theorem 1 then follows by induction from the next claim.

Lemma 6: Consider a fitness type i ¡ 1 . Suppose α ¡ 2 . Suppose further that Ljt
converges to one in probability for each j ¤ i  1 . Then, for each ξ P p0 , 1 s there is a
sequence of random variables tθit pξ qu, non-increasing between arrival dates, such that
I i
E pKit 1 | Ht q  Kit ¥ rξ  p1  Lit  θit pξ qqsA

for all t ¥ 1 , where each tθit pξ qu converges in probability to a function θi pξ q, which
converges to zero as ξ approaches zero.
That is, if Ljt converges to one in probability for each j i ¤ I. Then, in the limit,
the probability of revealing new information about i preferences is small only if the
fraction of extant knowledge about i preferences, Lit , is close to one.18
A.1.1. Proof of Lemma 6.
The proof of Lemma 4, which is a special case of Lemma 6 except for its focus on
the 1 player role in particular, goes through with slight modifications to the notation
developed here for the i ¡ 1 players. Thus, Lemma 6 will be proved directly but not
Lemma 4. For the remainder of this section fix a player role i ¡ 1 .
We focus on dominance-solvable i player subgames. Rather than keep track of all
of these, fix two end-nodes of the i player extensive form and consider subgames in
which particular outcomes are available at these nodes. In particular, enumerate the
terminal nodes of the i subtree as follows. Fix distinct actions a1 , a2 P A. Name
18 Indeed,

1

 Lit

the probability of revealing new information about i is clearly small whenever

is small. The converse is not as obviously true. Lemma 6, however, provides an

appropriate bound. It decomposes E pKit

1

| Ht q Kit into a factor of 1  Lit , which accounts

for information yet to be revealed about i preferences, and a residual θit pξ q. The residual arises
for two reasons—from i-type subgames in which i player choice does not reveal information

because it is unclear what i players believe about the remaining players’ choices, and because of
outcomes that are avoided by the remaining opponents, making it difficult to reveal information
about i’s preferences over those outcomes.
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“one” an end-node reachable after i chooses a1 , and label “two” one of the end-nodes
reachable after i chooses a2 . Enumerate the remaining end-nodes “3 ” through “Ai ”
in some fixed way.
Definition 4: Let Qi pz, z 1 q be the set of i player subgames with outcome z appended
to “one”, and z 1 appended to “two” that satisfy additionally the following. For each
game in Qi pz, z 1 q the i  1 player subgames following i’s choice of a1 and a2 are
dominance-solvable (uniquely) resulting in z, and z 1 , respectively, and moreover one of
the actions a1 , a2 is uniquely dominant for the i players themselves. 19
Definition 5: Let Qit denote all the i player subgames possible in period t,20 and
denote by Qit  Qit the subgames for which all 1 , . . . , i  1 player preferences have
been revealed along Ht .
Definition 6: Let the random variable Nit denote pairs of outcomes pz, z 1 q available
in period t for which i’s favored among z and z 1 has not been revealed along Ht .
Suppose a subgame q P Qi pz, z 1 qX Qit is reached, with zi ¡ zi1 . By A4 every i player
there will choose a1 , and moreover, every ToM observer will know that every i player
chose a1 . By the definition of Qi pz, z 1 q X Qit , the backward induction outcomes of the
subgames following a1 and a2 are common knowledge among ToM players. Every ToM
can then infer that zi ¡ zi1 , since if it were the case that zi ¤ zi1 , a positive fraction of
the ToM s in role i would have chosen some a  a1 rather than a1 .

It follows then that if pz, z 1 q P Nit and the i players in period t reach a subgame in
Qi pz, z 1 qX Qit , their choice there reveals new information about their preferences. The
fraction of i subgames, among those in Qit , where i choice reveals new information
°
about i preferences is then bounded below by Nit |Qi pz, z 1 q X Qit |{|Qit |.

The set of games at date t is just the T -times product of Zt , and each game is drawn
uniformly from this set. The empirical distribution over games realized at date t can
then be replicated by drawing AI i i-player subgames uniformly and independently
from Qit . There are AI i i player decision nodes. Therefore,


E pKit

1

 Kit | Htq ¥ 

¸

|Qipz, z1q X Q |

pz,z1 qPNit

|Qit|

it

AI

i
.

Consider now some additional required notation.
19 In

proving Lemma 4, since there is no subsequent player after the 1 fitness type, define

1
1
Q
1 pz, z q as the 1 player subgames with z available at a1 and z at a2 , where player 1’s are

not indifferent between z and z 1 .
20 Q

it

can be identified with the Ai times product of Zt .

(2)

26

Definition 7: Let Z, and Z t denote the rAi  2 s-times product of Z, and Zt , respectively. Bold letters x, z, etc., denote elements of Z. Define Z pz, z 1 q  Z
as follows. The tuple of outcomes x  px1 , . . . , xr q P Z pz, z 1 q if and only if the
subgame with z at node “one”, z 1 at node “two”, x1 at “three”, ..., xr at node
Ai , is in Qi pz, z 1 q. Define then the functions Et pz, z 1 q  |Z i pz, z 1 q X Z t |{|Z t |, and
³
E pz, z 1 q  xPZ i pz,z 1 q f px1 q    f pxr q dx.
Since each i player subgame has Ai endnodes, |Qit |  |Zt |2 |Z t |. Thus, for any finite
subset X  Z  Z,

|Qipz, z1q X Qit| ¥ ¸ |Qipz, z1q X Qit|  |Qit z Qit|
|Qit|
|Qit|
|Qit|
pz,z1 qPX
pz,z1 qPX
¸ |Qi pz, z 1 q X Qit |
|Qit z Qit|


|Qit|
|Zt| |Z t|
pz,z1 qPX
¸
( |Qit z Qit |
¥ |Z1 |
.
E pz, z 1 q  sup
E pz, z 1 q  E pz, z 1 q 
|
Qit |
1 qPZ Z
t
p
z,z
1
pz,z qPX
¸

2

(3)

t

2

Write S pξ q  tpz, z 1 q P Z  Z : E pz, z 1 q
φt



ξ u , and let

sup
E pz, z 1 q  Et pz, z 1 q
1
pz,z qPZ Z

(

|Qit z Qit| .
|Qit|

Equations (2) and (3) yield


E pKit

1

 Kit | Htq ¥  |Z1 |
t

¥



2

¸

pz,z1 qPNit z S pξq

AI i

E pz, z 1 q  φt 

ξ
|Zt|2 pNit  |S pξq X tZt  Ztu |q  φt

AI i

(4)

 
|
S pξ q X tZt  Zt u |
 ξ  1  Lit 
φ
.
|Zt|
The terms E pz, z 1 q, E pz, z 1 q and |Qit | are constant in between arrival dates; |Qit | is
non-decreasing. We thus define the random variable θ pξ q from the claim,
|S pξq X tZt  Ztu | 1  φ .
θ pξ q 
|Z |
ξ




AI

i

t

2

t

it

it

t

2

t

³

Lemma 1 implies |S pξ q X tZt  Zt u |{|Zt |2 converges to S pξq f pz qf pz 1 qdzdz 1 , which
tends to zero as ξ approaches zero (recall A2). Furthermore, if Ljt ÝÑ 1 in probability,
then |Qit z Qit |{|Qit | ÝÑ 0 in probability. With that in mind set θi pξ q from the claim
³
to S pξq f pz qf pz 1 qdzdz 1 . The claim is then established by the following result.
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Claim 1: Et pz, z 1 q almost surely converges uniformly to E pz, z 1 q. That is
sup |Et pz, z 1 q  E pz, z 1 q| ÝÑ 0
pz,z1 qPZ Z
almost surely.
Proof. We rely on the result from Potscher and Prucha [7]—
Suppose Et almost surely converges pointwise to E on Z  Z. If E is continuous,
and if the sequence Et is almost surely asymptotically uniformly equicontinuous
on Z  Z, then Et almost surely converges uniformly to E on Z  Z.
The required asymptotically uniform equicontinuity condition is:

|E pz, z1q  E px, x1q| ÝÑ 0

ÝÑ 0 ,

(5)

where we use B pz, z 1 , η q to denote the open ball tpz, z 1 q P Z  Z : ρppz, z 1 q, px, x1 qq

ηu .

lim sup

sup

sup

ÝÑ8 pz,z1 qPZ Z px,x1 qPBpz,z1 ,ηq

t

t

a.s. as η

t

By Lemma 1 Et pz, z 1 q almost surely converges pointwise to E pz, z 1 q. A2 gives E pz, z 1 q
continuous. We complete the proof by verifying (5).
Define the set Z pz, z 1 , η q  Z t such that x P Z pz, z 1 , η q if and only if for every
coordinate x of x, both miniPI |xi  zi | ¥ η, and miniPI |xi  zi1 | ¥ η. Then, for each
pz, z1q P Z  Z, and each px, x1q P B pz, z1, ηq,

1

|E pz, z1q  E px, x1q| ¤ |Z t z Z|Zpz,| z , ηq|  U pz, z1, ηq.
t

t

t

t

Lemma 1 implies Ut pz, z 1 , η q almost surely converges uniformly to
U pz, z 1 , η q 

»

P z Z pz,z1 ,ηq

x Z

f px1 q    f pxr q dx.

Hence,

lim sup

ÝÑ8

t

sup
sup
|Etpz, z1q  Etpx, x1q|
1
1
1
pz,z qPZ Z px,x qPBpz,z ,ηq

¤ tÝÑ8
lim

sup

pz,zqPZ Z

Ut pz, z 1 , η q ÝÑ

A2 ensures the limit converges to zero as η

sup U pz, z 1 , η q a.s.
pz,z1 qPZ Z

ÝÑ 0 .

(6)
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A.1.2. Proof of Lemma 5.
Fix a preference type i P I and assume the hypotheses of the lemma. In the remainder we suppress the i subscripts whenever it is possible to do so without confusion.
The proof is given in two parts. The first shows that Lt converges in probability
to a random variable L. The second establishes that L equals one a.e. In order to
establish the convergence of Lt we show that when α ¡ 2 these processes belongs to a
class of generalized sub-martingales with the sub-martingale convergence property. In
particular, we use the following definition and result in this connection [(Egghe, 1984),
Definition VIII.1.3 and Theorem VIII.1.22].
w-submil Convergence: The adapted process pLt , Ht q is a weak sub-martingale
in the limit (w-submil) if almost surely, for each η ¡ 0 , there is a n such that
τ ¥ t ¥ n implies P tE pLτ | Ht q  Lt ¥ η u ¡ 1  η. If Lt is an integrable w-submil,
then there exists a random variable L such that Lt ÝÑ L in probability.
Part 1: Lt converges in probability to a random variable L. In view of the w-submil
convergence result we show that tLt u is a w-submil under the hypotheses of Lemma 5.
As first step we prove that the arrival date subsequence tLtk u is a w-submil. Toward
that end, consider consecutive arrival dates t , τ  , with τ  ¡ t . By the definition of Lt ,
Lτ 

 Lt 

τ
1
¸
1
|Zτ  |2 tt rKt

 Kts  |Z  ||Z ||Z  |  Lt .
2

2

τ

1

t

τ

Then, by the hypotheses of the result being proved, for each ξ
τ
¸1



t t



¥

E pKt

τ
¸1



t t





1

(7)

2

P p0 , 1 s,

 Kt | Ht q


ξE 1


AI i



 Lt  θ pξq  Ht

¡ rτ   ts  ξ  E

(8)

it



1



 Lτ 1  θ  pξq  Ht

AI i

it

The third line uses the fact that Lt is non-decreasing between arrival dates, that θit pξ q
is non-increasing between arrival dates (see the definition of θit pξ q in the statement of
Claim 5).
Combining equations (7) and (8), and using the fact that Lτ 
surely, yields—after some algebra—

¥ Lτ 1 |Z  | {|Z  |
2

t

2

τ
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E pLτ  | Ht q  Lt

|Zt|
E pLτ  | Ht q ¡
|Z  |

2

τ

ùñ

0
2





|Z  |  |Z  |
1  θ  pξ q  
τ   t
1
ξ

it

2

2

τ



t



1
AI i



 A  pξ q.

(9)

t

The left-hand-side of (9) surely converges to 1  θit pξ q for each ξ P p0 , 1 s. To see
this note that |Zt |2 {|Zτ  |2 ÝÑ surely converges to one, and observe that if t is the
arrival date of the k-th new outcome then

|Z  |  |Z  |  p|Z | k
τ   t
tp|Z |
k
which surely converges to zero when α ¡ 2 .
2

2

τ

1

t

1

1 q2  p|Z1 |
1 qα u  tp|Z1 |

k q2
,
k qα u

In the remainder hatted variables will be used to denote variables sampled at arrival
dates, e.g., L̂k  Ltk .

¡0

We use (9) to prove the following. For each η
all arrival dates tm , tn , such that n ¡ m ¥ M ,
P tE pL̂n | Ĥm q  L̂m

there exists an M such that for

¥ ηu ¡ 1  η.

(10)

To that end suppose for some m and n, that n ¡ m, E pL̂n | Ĥm q
E pL̂n | Ĥm q  L̂m





n¸1



E pE pL̂k

1

L̂m . Since

| Ĥk q  L̂ | Ĥmq,
k

k m

there is at least one k, with m ¤ k n  1 , such that E pL̂k 1 | Ĥm q E pL̂k | Ĥm q. Let r
be the largest integer in tm, , . . . , n  1 u for which this is the case, i.e., E pL̂k 1 | Ĥm q ¥
E pL̂k | Ĥm q, for each k  r 1 , . . . , n  1 . According to (9)
E pL̂r

1

| Ĥmq ¡ E pA pξq | Ĥmq.
tr

Hence,
E pL̂n | Ĥm q  L̂m

¡

E pAtr pξ q | Ĥm q  L̂m

¥

E pAtr pξ q | Ĥm q  1 .

Now, recall that At pξ q converges surely to 1  θit pξ q which, by the hypothesis of the
claim, converges in probability to 1  θi pξ q. We can then choose an arrival M large
enough so that
P tE pAtk pξ q | Ĥm q  1

¡ 2  θ pξqu ¡ 1  2  θ pξq
for all k and m with k ¡ m ¥ M, and thus for k ¡ m ¥ M ,
P tE pL̂n | Ĥm q  L̂m ¡ 2  θ pξ qu ¡ 1  2  θ pξ q.
i

i

i

i
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By assumption θi pξ q converges to zero as ξ approaches zero. Hence (10) can be
obtained by choosing ξ so that θi pξ q η {2 and thus tL̂k u is a w-submil.

Having established that tL̂k u is a w-submil, it remains to show that tLt u is also a
w-submil. Consider any dates t and τ where t τ. Then
|Z  |2
Lτ  Lt ¥ Lτ   Lt t 2
|Zτ  |

everywhere, when t is the first arrival date after t and τ  is the greatest arrival date
less than or equal to τ. Since tL̂k u is a w-submil and each |Lt | bounded above by 1,
the w-submil convergence result implies Lτ   Lt ÝÑ 0 in probability. Furthermore,
|Zt|2 {|Zt 1 |2 ÝÑ 1 . Hence the right-hand side of the last indented expression converges to zero in probability establishing that tLt u is a w-submil.
Part 2: Lt converges to one in probability. Let L denote the limit, in probability,
of Lt . By the hypotheses of Lemma 5,
E pLt q 
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t 0

¥ξ

AI

i
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|Zτ |2





1
τ ÝÑ8 τ
Then, since τ {|Zτ |2
bounded by one,
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E p1

 Ktq {|Zτ |

2

τ 1
1 ¸
E p1
τ t1

It is straightforward to show that
lim

1

 Lit  θ pξqq

AI

 Lit  θ pξqq

i

it

AI

i

it



(11)
.

 E p1  L  θ pξqq
i

AI

i

.

t 1

ÝÑ 8 whenever α ¡ 2 ,21
E p1

(11) implies, since Lt is everywhere

 L  θ pξqq ¤ 0 ,
for all ξ P p0 , 1 s. By assumption θ pξ q tends to zero as ξ approaches zero, implying
E p1  Lq  0 , and thus L  1 a.e.
i

i

A.2. Proof of Theorem 2.
Recall A2 describing the cdf F on the payoff space rm, M sI and the implied cdf for
games given by G, on the payoff space rm, M sIT .
Definition 8: Let µ denote the measure on games induced by F . In particular, for
³
each measurable S  Q, µpS q  qPS dGpq q. Let µt denote the corresponding empirical
measure. That is, µt pS q  |S X Qt |{|Qt |.
21 Recall

t{|Zt |

2

that |Zt |

¥ |Zt | {|Zt |
α

 |Z |
1
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.

k whenever

p|Z |

t

1

kqα u

¤

t

t

p|Z |
1

k

1 qα u therefore
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We establish the result of Theorem 2 by showing that the ratio of the population of
any alternative type to that of the SPE-ToM type tends to zero in probability.22 If
the alternative type is a ToM type that differs from SPE-ToM only a set of µ measure
zero, it should simply be identified with SPE-ToM. It also follows that µpS̄ q ¡ 0 where
S̄ is the set of games for which player role i has no dominant choice at any node.23
However, the set of games for which player role i has a dominant choice at some but not
all nodes also has positive µ measure. For simplicity, we then rule out the possibility
that the alternative ToM type differs from SPE-ToM with positive probability only
on this set and agrees with it with probability one on S̄.
We recall a key hypothesis of Theorem 2—
A5: For each i ¡ 1 , every alternative i ToM type differs from the SPE-ToM at every
i decision node in a set of games S with positive µ measure.
That is, in the limit, the alternative type will differ from the SPE-ToM on a set of
games that occur with positive probability. What about the naive alternative types?
Any such naive type differs from the SPE-ToM type on S̄ given that the game is
new. That the game is new will be assured with probability that tends to one, so we
effectively assign S  S̄ in this conditional sense.
For the remainder fix a player role i
in role i.

1 and fix one alternative type to the SPE-ToM

Definition 9: Let the random variable Rit be the fraction of the population in player
role i that is SPE-ToM.
The proof of Theorem 2 is by induction on i. It follows from A4 that R1 t  1 is
satisfied vacuously. The result is then established by proving that if Rjt ÝÑ 1 , in
probability, j  1 , ..., i  1 , then Rit converges in probability to one. Assume then in
what follows that Rjt ÝÑ 1 , in probability, j  1 , ..., i  1 .
Consider some prerequisites.
Definition 10: The random variable It pδ q P t0 , 1 u is such that It pδ q  1 if and only
if the game drawn at date t belongs to the set Qδ , where Qδ is the set of games where
the minimum absolute payoff difference for any pair of outcomes, for any player is
greater than δ ¥ 0 .
22 Recall
23 This

there is a finite number of types.
follows since any game with a dominant choice at some node for i can be mapped to a

game for which this is not true by swapping an outcome in the dominant set of outcomes with
an outcome that is not in this set.
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Definition 11: Define the random variable Dt P t0 , 1 u such that it satisfies the
following. If the alternative is a naive type, then Dt  1 if and only if the game
drawn at date t is new, and is such that the game has no dominant strategy at any i
decision node. If the alternative is a ToM type, then Dt  1 if and only if at date t
the alternative type behaves differently from the SPE-ToM at every i role information
set.
The restrictions that define Qδ are measurable, so Qδ itself is measurable. It is an
immediate consequence of Lemma 1 that P tIt pδ q  1 | Ht u almost surely converges
to µpQδ q. Similarly, Lemma 1 implies if the alternative type is a ToM type, then
P tDt  1 | Ht u almost surely converges to µpS q.
Definition 12: The random variable Jt pεq P t0 , 1 u is such that Jt pεq  1 if and only
if 1) all 1 , . . . , i  1 player preferences in the game drawn at t have been revealed to
the ToM types; and 2) at each role i  1 decision node that can be reached by role i,
the fraction of resulting play that reaches an SPE outcome in that subgame is at least
1  ε.
As a key ingredient in the proof consider the following result.
Claim 2: For each sufficiently small δ ¡ 0 and ε ¡ 0 the following results hold given
that Jt pεq  1 throughout. i) If the alternative type is a ToM type, given It pδ q  1
and Dt  1 as well, then the ratio of the expected payoff of the alternative type to
δ
ε M
that of the SPE-ToM is at most 1
1 ε m  M . ii) If the alternative type is naive,
given It pδ q  1 and Dt  1 as well, then the ratio of the expected payoff of the
 δ
ε M
1
alternative type to that of the SPE-ToM is at most 1

1

1 ε m
A M . iii)
Whenever It p0 q  1 , the ratio of the expected payoff of the alternative type—ToM or
ε M
naive—to that of the SPE-ToM is at most 1 1 
ε m.
Proof. Fix a date t. Assume It p0 q  1 , since this is required in each of the three
claims. Let z phq then be the unique SPE payoff in the continuation game defined by
the i role information set h, at date t. Let mphq be the measure of players that reach
the i role information set h at date t.
Consider i). Since Jt pεq  1 , at most a fraction ε of any i player cognitive type is
matched with remaining players that do not behave as in the unique pure SPE. When
matched with these non-SPE remaining players, the alternative type’s expected payoff
is at most M . Since Dt  1 , by assumption, the alternative type chooses differently
from the SPE-ToM at every i information set. The ratio of the expected payoff of the
alternative type to that of the SPE-ToM is then at most


p1  εq

¸
h

mphq pz phq  δ q

εM

O

p 1  εq

¸
h

mphqz phq .
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Since z phq P rm, M s, i) follows. The proof of ii) relies on a similar argument, the factor
1  1 {A arising from naive mixed choice. To establish iii) observe that an alternative
type cannot do better than the SPE-ToM when matched with remaining players that
act as in the unique SPE—i.e., set δ in the expression above to zero.

Consider the realized one period growth rate of the alternative ToM type relative
to that of the SPE-ToM at date t. (We omit the detailed argument for a naive alternative since it is nearly identical.) In view of Claim 2, this rate is bounded above by


It pδ qJt pεqDt  ln 1
It p0 qp1

 ItpδqqJtpεq  ln

p1  Itp0 q

1

 Mδ

M
1 ε m
ε



ε

1

1

M

(12)

ε m

 Jtpεqq  ln M {m.

To see that the indicator functions here exhaust all possible cases, note first that
the first two terms of the expression apply for every case in which Jt pεq  1 , and
It p0 q  1 , in the light of Claim 2. Then observe that the last term covers cases when
either Jt pεq  0 or It p0 q  0 . The ln M {m factor arising in the cases not covered by
Claim 2 yields an upper bound given that the maximum ratio of expected offspring
for any two types is M {m 8.
By Claim 2, (12) holds for each sufficiently small δ
δ
ε M
0.
reminder, fix these numbers so that 1 
εm  M

¡

0 , and ε

¡

0 . For the

For any indicator functions A, B, and C, ABC ¥ A B C  2 . Moreover,
It p0 qJt pεq ¤ 1 . Thus, the quantity expressed in (12) is bounded above by
∆t pδ, εq  pDt



Jt pεq  1 q  ln 1

p1  Itpδqq  ln
p1  Itp0 q

1



1

ε

M
1 ε m

M

εm
 N
ε

M

δ

1

1

 Jtpεqq  ln M {m.

ε

M
1 ε m



δ
M



(13)

The ratio of the population of the alternative type to that of the SPE-ToM at date
°
τ is then bounded above by the random variable r0  rτ , where ln rτ ¤ τt1 ∆t pδ, εq.
°
The result is established by showing that τt1 ∆t pδ, εq{τ converges in probability to
δ
ε M
a negative constant for suitably chosen δ ¡ 0 and ε ¡ 0 satisfying 1 
0.
εm  M
We rely on the following claims.
Claim 3: Suppose α ¡ 2 . If Rjt ÝÑ 1 in probability, j
converges in probability to one, for each ε ¡ 0 .

 1 , ..., i1 , then 1τ °τt1 Jtpεq
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Proof. Fix ε P p0 , 1 s. If α ¡ 2 , then Theorem 1 applies. Under the hypotheses of the claim Jt pεq ÝÑ 1 in probability. Thus E pJt pεqq tends to one. Then
°
°
E p 1τ τt1 Jt pεqq ÝÑ 1 . Since Jt pεq ¤ 1 everywhere it follows that 1τ τt1 Jt pεq converges to one in probability.

°

Claim 4: i) 1τ τt1 It pδ q almost surely converges to µpQδ q. ii) Suppose α
T and

that the alternative is a naive type. Let µ be the measure of games where i has no
°
dominant action at any node. Then 1τ τt1 Dt converges in probability to µ . iii)
°
Assume A5. If the alternative is a ToM, then 1τ τt1 Dt almost surely converges to
µpS q ¡ 0 , where S is as described in A5.
Proof. Consider i). Lemma 1 implies E pIt pδ q|H8 q converges to µpQδ q for almost
°
every complete history H8 . Hence, 1τ τt1 E pIt pδ q|H8 q ÝÑ µpQδ q almost surely in
H8 . The random variables pIt pδ q|H8 q are independent, and the sequence satisfies
°
Kolmogorov’s criterion. The strong law of large numbers implies 1τ τt1 rpIt pδ q|H8 q
°
E pIt pδ q|H8 qs ÝÑ 0 , for almost every H8 . Hence 1τ τt1 pIt pδ q|H8 q ÝÑ µpQδ q, for
°
almost every H8 , so that 1τ τt1 It pδ q ÝÑ µpQδ q. This completes the proof of i). A
similar proof establishes iii).
Consider now ii). Assume the alternative is a naive type. Define the random variable At such that At  1 if the game drawn at date t is new, and let At  0 otherwise.
Let Bt equal one if the game realized at t has no dominant strategy for role i at any
i information set; let Bt be one otherwise. For any indicator functions A and B,
A B  1 ¤ AB ¤ B. Hence, surely
1
τ

τ̧



t 1

pAt  1 q

1
τ

τ̧



t 1

Bt

¤ 1τ

τ̧



t 1

Dt

¤ 1τ

τ̧



Bt .

(14)

t 1

E pAt q is just E p1  γt q, where γt is the fraction of games played previously among those
available at date t. Whenever α T , γt surely converges to zero (Theorem 1). Clearly
°
then, E p 1τ τt1 At q ÝÑ 1 , whenever α T . Since At is surely bounded above by one,
°
it follows that 1τ τt1 At ÝÑ 1 , in probability, whenever α T . In light of (14) it then
°
suffices to show that 1τ τt1 Bt tends to µ . To see this is in fact the case note first that
Lemma 1 implies that E pBt |H8 q converges to µ for almost every complete history H8 .
Then note that the random variables pBt |H8 q are independent, for each H8 , and that
°
the sequence satisfies Kolmogorov’s criterion. Thus, 1τ τt1 rpBt |H8 q E pBt |H8 qs ÝÑ
°
°
0 , so that 1τ τt1 pBt |H8 q ÝÑ µ , so 1τ τt1 Bt ÝÑ µ , almost surely.

Claims 3 and 4 (using also (13) and the fact that µpQδ q converges to one as δ tends
to zero) then give that
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1
τ

τ̧





∆t pδ, εq ÝÑ µpS q  ln 1

t 1

p1  µpQδ qq  ln

M
1 ε m
ε



1

 Mδ
ε

M
1 ε m

 N

1

ε

M
1 ε m



δ
M

(15)



,

in probability.
ε M
δ
We can choose ε ¡ 0 and δ ¡ 0 so that 1 
0 , and simultaneously the
εm  M
δ
q
limiting value in (15) is negative. That is, choose a δ such that µpS q  lnp1  M
δ
p1  µpQδ qq  lnp1 {r1  M sq 0 , and then choose a sufficiently small but positive ε.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2 since for such ε and δ, we have shown lnτrτ is
bounded above, in the limit, in probability, by a negative constant. Hence rτ ÝÑ 0 ,
in probability.
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B. Instructions
Page 1
In this experiment you will participate in a series of two person decision problems. The experiment
will last for a number of rounds. Each round you will be randomly paired with another individual.
The joint decisions made by you and the other person will determine how much money you will earn
in that round.
Your earnings will be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. We will not tell anyone
else your earnings. We ask that you do not discuss your earnings with anyone else.
If you have a question at any time, please raise your hand.
Page 2
You will see a diagram similar to one on your screen at the beginning of the experiment. You and
another person will participate in a decision problem shown in the diagram.
One of you will be Person 1 (orange). The other person will be Person 2 (blue). In the upper left
corner, you will see whether you are Person 1 or Person 2.
You will be either a Person 1 or a Person 2 for the entire experiment.
Page 3
Notice the four pairs of squares with numbers in them; each pair consists of two earnings boxes.
The earnings boxes show the different earnings you and the other person will make, denoted in
Experimental Dollars. There are two numbers, Person 1 will earn what is in the orange box, and
Person 2 will earn what is in the blue box if that decision is reached.
In this experiment, you can only see the earnings in your own box. That is, if you are Person
1 you will only see the earnings in the orange boxes, and if you are Person 2 you will only see the
earnings in the blue boxes. Both boxes will be visible, but the number in the other persons box will
be replaced with a “?”.
However, for each amount that you earn, the amount the other person earns is fixed. In other
words, for each amount that Person 1 sees, there is a corresponding, unique amount that will always
be shown to Person 2.
For example, suppose Person 1 sees an earnings box containing “12” in round 1. In the same pair,
suppose Person 2 sees “7”. Then, at any later round, anytime Person 1 sees “12”, Person 2 will see
“7”.
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Together, you and the other person will choose a path through the diagram to an earnings box.
We will describe how you make choices next.
Page 4
A node, displayed as a circle and identified by a letter, is a point at which a person makes a
decision. Notice that the nodes are color coded to indicate whether Person 1 or Person 2 will be
making that decision. You will always have two options.
If you are you Person 1 you will always choose either “Right” or “Down”, which will select a node
at which Person 2 will make a decision.
If you are Person 2 you will also choose either “Right” or “Down” which will select a pair of
earnings boxes for you and Person 1.
Once a pair of earnings boxes is chosen, the round ends, and each of you will be able to review the
decisions made in that round.
Page 5
In each round all pairs will choose a path through the same set of nodes and earnings boxes. This
is important because at the end of each round, in addition to your own outcome, you will be able to
see how many pairs ended up at each other possible outcome.
While you review your own results from a round, a miniature figure showing all possible paths
through nodes and to earnings boxes will be displayed on the right hand side of the screen.
The figure will show how many pairs chose a path to each set of earnings boxes.
The Payoff History table will update to display your payoff from the current period.
Page 6
We have provided you with a pencil and a piece of paper on which you may write down any
information you deem relevant for your decisions. At the end of the experiment, please return the
paper and pencil to the experimenter.
At the end of the experiment, we will randomly choose 2 rounds for payment, and your earnings
from those rounds will be summed and converted to $CAD at a rate of 1 Experimental Dollar = $2.
Important points:
You will be either a Person 1 or a Person 2 for the entire experiment.
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Each round you will be randomly paired with another person for that round.
Person 1 always makes the first decision in a round.
Person 1’s payoff is in the orange earnings box and Person 2’s in the blue earnings box.
Each person will only be able to see the numbers in their own earnings box.
Earnings always come in unique pairs so that for each amount observed by Person 1, the
number observed by Person 2 will be fixed.
In a given round, all pairs will choose a path through the same set of nodes and earnings boxes.
After each round you will be able to see how many pairs ended up at each outcome.
We will choose 2 randomly selected periods for payment at the end of the experiment.
Any questions?
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C.

Figure C1:

Screenshots

Screenshot for Player 1. This figure shows the screen as

player 1 sees it prior to submitting his choice of action. The yellow highlighted
node indicates that player 1 has provisionally chosen the corresponding action,
but the decision is not final until the submit button is clicked. While waiting
for player 1 to choose, player 2 sees the same screen except that she is unable
to make a decision, provisional choices by player 1 are not observable, and
the “Submit” button is invisible.
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Figure C2:

Screenshot for Player 2. This figure shows the screen as

player 2 sees it after player 1 has chosen an action. Here, player 1 chose to
move down, so the upper right portion of the game tree is no longer visible.
While player 2 is making a decision, player 1 sees an identical screen except
that he is unable to make a decision and the “Submit” button is invisible.
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Figure C3:

Screenshot of Post-Decision Review. This figure shows

the final screen subjects see in each period after both player 1 and player 2
have made their decisions. The smaller game tree in the upper right portion
of the figure displays information about how many pairs ended up at each
outcome. For the purposes of the screenshot, the software was run with only
one pair, but in a typical experiment, subjects learned about the decisions of
4 pairs (3 other than their own).
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D.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
1

Autism-Spectrum Quotient Questionnaire

I prefer to do things with others rather than on my own.
I prefer to do things the same way over and over again.
If I try to imagine something, I find it very easy to create a picture in my mind.
I frequently get so absorbed in one thing that I lose sight of other things.
I often notice small sounds when others do not.
I usually notice car number plates of similar strings of information.
Other people frequently tell me that what I’ve said is impolite, even though I think it is polite.
When I’m reading a story, I can easily imagine what the characters might look like.
I am fascinated by dates.
In a social group, I can easily keep track of several different people’s conversations.
I find social situations easy.
I tend to notice details that others do not.
I would rather go to a library than a party.
I find making up stories easy.
I find myself drawn more strongly to people than to things.
I tend to have very strong interests, which I get upset about if I can’t pursue.
I enjoy social chit-chat.
When I talk, it isn’t always easy for others to get a word in edgeways.
I am fascinated by numbers.
When I’m reading a story I find it difficult to work out the characters’ intentions.
I don’t particularly enjoy reading fiction.
I find it hard to make new friends.
I notice patterns in things all the time.
I would rather go to the theatre than a museum.
It does not upset me if my daily routine is disturbed.
I frequently find that I don’t know how to keep a conversation going.
I find it easy to “read between the lines” when someone is talking to me.
I usually concentrate more on the whole picture, rather than the small details.
I am not very good at remembering phone numbers.
I don’t usually notice small changes in a situation, or a person’s appearance.
I know how to tell if someone listening to me is getting bored.
I find it easy to do more than one thing at once.
When I talk on the phone, I’m not sure when it’s my turn to speak.
I enjoy doing things spontaneously.
I am often the last to understand the point of a joke.
I find it easy to work out what someone else is thinking or feeling just by looking at their face.
If there is an interruption, I can switch back to what I was doing very quickly.
I am good at social chit-chat.
People often tell me that I keep going on and on about the same thing.
When I was young, I used to enjoy playing games involving pretending with other children.
I like to collect information about categories of things (e.g. types of car, types of bird,
types of train, types of plant, etc.
I find it difficult to imagine what it would be like to be someone else.
I like to plan any activities I participate in carefully.
I enjoy social occasions.
I find it difficult to work out people’s intentions.
New situations make me anxious.
I enjoy meeting new people.
I am a good diplomat.
I am not very good at remembering people’s date of birth.
I find it very easy to play games with children that involve pretending.

 definitely agree, 2  slightly agree, 3  slightly disagree, 4  definitely disagree

[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]

[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]
[1]

[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]
[2]

[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]
[3]

[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
[4]
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E.

Broad Autism Phenotype Questionnaire

You are about to fill out a series of statements related to personality and lifestyle. For each question, circle
that answer that best describes how often that statement applies to you. Many of these questions ask
about your interactions with other people. Please think about the way you are with most people, rather
than special relationships you may have with spouses or significant others, children, siblings, and parents.
Everyone changes over time, which can make it hard to fill out questions about personality. Think about
the way you have been the majority of your adult life, rather than the way you were as a teenager, or times
you may have felt different than normal. You must answer each question, and give only one answer per
question. If you are confused, please give it your best guess.

1

I like being around other people.

1

2

3

4

5

6

2

I find it hard to get my words out smoothly.

1

2

3

4

5

6

3

I am comfortable with unexpected changes in plans.

1

2

3

4

5

6

4

It’s hard for me to avoid getting sidetracked in conversation.

1

2

3

4

5

6

5

I would rather talk to people to get information than to socialize.

1

2

3

4

5

6

6 People have to talk me into trying something new.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 I am “in-tune” with the other person during conversation.*

1

2

3

4

5

6

8 I have to warm myself up to the idea of visiting an unfamiliar place.

1

2

3

4

5

6

9 I enjoy being in social situations.

1

2

3

4

5

6

10 My voice has a flat or monotone sound to it.

1

2

3

4

5

6

11 I feel disconnected or “out of sync” in conversations with others.*

1

2

3

4

5

6

12 People find it easy to approach me.*

1

2

3

4

5

6

13 I feel a strong need for sameness from day to day.

1

2

3

4

5

6

14 People ask me to repeat things I’ve said because they don’t understand.

1

2

3

4

5

6

15 I am flexible about how things should be done.

1

2

3

4

5

6

16 I look forward to situations where I can meet new people.

1

2

3

4

5

6

17 I have been told that I talk too much about certain topics.

1

2

3

4

5

6

18 When I make conversation it is just to be polite.*

1

2

3

4

5

6

19 I look forward to trying new things.

1

2

3

4

5

6

20 I speak too loudly or softly.

1

2

3

4

5

6

21 I can tell when someone is not interested in what I am saying.*

1

2

3

4

5

6

22 I have a hard time dealing with changes in my routine.

1

2

3

4

5

6

23 I am good at making small talk.*

1

2

3

4

5

6

24 I act very set in my ways.

1

2

3

4

5

6

25 I feel like I am really connecting with other people.

1

2

3

4

5

6

26 People get frustrated by my unwillingness to bend.

1

2

3

4

5

6

27 Conversation bores me.*

1

2

3

4

5

6

28 I am warm and friendly in my interactions with others.*

1

2

3

4

5

6

29 I leave long pauses in conversation.

1

2

3

4

5

6

30 I alter my daily routine by trying something different.

1

2

3

4

5

6

31 I prefer to be alone rather than with others.

1

2

3

4

5

6

32 I lose track of my original point when talking to people.

1

2

3

4

5

6

33 I like to closely follow a routine while working.

1

2

3

4

5

6

34 I can tell when it is time to change topics in conversation.*

1

2

3

4

5

6

35 I keep doing things the way I know, even if another way might be better.

1

2

3

4

5

6

36 I enjoy chatting with people.

1

2

3

4

5

6

*Casual interaction with acquaintances, rather than special relationships such as with close friends and family members

BAPQ

1—very rarely
2—rarely
3—occasionally
4—somewhat often
5—often
6—very often
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F.

Additional Tables and Figures

6-10-1

7-8-1

7-8-2

7-10-1

7-10-2

7-8-3

7-6-1

7-8-4

7-10-3

7-8-5

Pairs SPE

0.84

0.68

0.54

0.62

0.61

0.63

0.44

0.51

0.46

0.68

P1 SPE

0.87

0.72

0.59

0.64

0.71

0.67

0.54

0.61

0.54

0.70

P1 Heur

0.52

0.36

0.40

0.42

0.38

0.42

0.45

0.34

0.55

0.43

0.79

0.64

0.52

0.55

0.58

0.55

0.36

0.49

0.37

0.64

0.89

0.81

0.60

0.86

0.74

0.88

0.71

0.58

0.75

0.78

P1 SPE | heur
P1 SPE | heur

 SPE
 SPE

P1 SPE | No Heur

0.88

0.71

0.69

0.65

0.72

0.70

0.49

0.56

0.57

0.74

P2 Dom

0.95

0.94

0.90

0.98

0.86

0.94

0.84

0.85

0.82

0.97

0.96

0.94

0.91

0.98

0.87

0.94

0.83

0.84

0.86

0.96

P2 SPE | P1 SPE

Table F1:

Observed Probability of Outcomes by Session.

Each entry is a probability that we observed a particular outcome in a particular session. Pairs
SPE refers to the probability that a pair ended at the SPE. P1 SPE is the probability that player
1’s choice was consistent with the SPE. P1 Heur is the probability that Player 1 chose in a manner
consistent with the “highest mean” rule of thumb (heuristic). P1 SPE | heur

 SPE is the probability

that player one followed the SPE when it did not correspond to the “highest mean” rule of thumb. P1
SPE | heur

 SPE is the probability that player one followed the SPE when it did correspond to the
“highest mean” rule of thumb. P1 SPE | No Heur is the probability that player 1 followed the SPE
when the rule of thumb was inapplicable (i.e. equal means). P2 Dom is the probability that player
2 chose the dominant strategy. P2 SPE

| P1 SPE is the conditional probability of player 2 choosing

the dominant strategy given that player 1 followed the SPE. Sessions are labeled in the format # of
Payoffs – # of Subjects – Session ID so that 7-10-2 corresponds to the 2nd session with 7 payoff pairs
and 10 subjects.
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